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Why does the Gemara (גמרא) require evaluating a person who says "damai alai" (my value) as an eved Kenani when a Jew cannot legally be sold in perpetuity? The shiur develops the yesod that market value reflects inherent personal worth—whatever an owner would pay for a worker's labor is precisely what that labor is worth to the person himself, regardless of whether he can legally enter that market.
This shiur analyzes Megillah 23b, focusing on the Mishna's requirement of ten people for redeeming consecrated land (karkos) and for the case of "adam ki yakdish" (when a person consecrates his own value). The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion leads to a fundamental question about human valuation: how do we assess the monetary worth of a person who pledges "damai alai" (my value) to hekdesh? Rashi (רש"י) explains that the requirement of ten people is not for mere appraisal but for the act of pidyon (redemption)—the transfer of kedushah from one object to another. When consecrated land is redeemed, or when a person redeems himself from a vow to give his value to hekdesh, ten people must oversee this transfer because it involves creating or transferring kedushah. This is fundamentally different from a standard monetary evaluation, which would require only three judges as a regular beis din. The Mishna is discussing davar shebekedushah (matters of sanctity), not merely financial assessment.
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Megillah 23b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
