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Does kiddushei kesef create the marriage without biah, or is it nothing without biah? The shiur argues that kesef accomplishes the kinyan aspect of marriage while biah establishes the issur eishah, making marriage a two-tier process. This reading resolves why shtar marriage requires the hekesh and how na'arah m'orasa can exist as a betulah despite the requirement of biah.
This shiur on Kiddushin 9b analyzes the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of the relationship between kiddushei kesef (monetary betrothal) and biah (marital relations) in creating a valid marriage. The central question is whether the Gemara's statement "kiddush v'hadar bo'el" means that kesef by itself accomplishes nothing without biah, or whether each component accomplishes something distinct. Rabbi Zweig proposes that the better reading is that kiddushin is a two-tiered kinyan: kesef creates the fundamental kinyan (ownership/acquisition), while biah establishes the issur eishah (the prohibited status making her forbidden to others). This interpretation avoids the logical problem of how two things that each accomplish "nothing" could together accomplish "something." Under this reading, after kesef alone, the woman belongs to the man enough that no one else could marry her, and she might even be able to eat terumah if he is a Kohen, but there is not yet an issur ervah that would subject her to skilah for adultery.
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Kiddushin 9b
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