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Does a father truly own his daughter, or does he merely have a legal right to her earnings and kiddushin money? The shiur analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that kiddushin involves actual ownership, contrasting it with Rashi (רש"י)'s view. This fundamental dispute shapes the entire discussion of who receives kiddushin money and how the father-daughter relationship differs from ownership of an eved ivri.
This shiur on Kiddushin 4a addresses fundamental questions about the nature of kiddushin and the father's relationship to his daughter. The primary focus is on understanding Tosafos (תוספות)'s position that a father truly owns his daughter, as opposed to Rashi (רש"י)'s view that the father merely has specific rights (zechusim) to her earnings and kiddushin money without actual ownership. Rabbi Zweig opens by clarifying Tosafos's approach to the Gemara (גמרא)'s havamina (initial assumption) and maskana (conclusion). According to Tosafos, the Gemara's initial assumption was that kiddushin is an issur (prohibition-based matter) rather than mamona (monetary matter), which would allow learning kiddushin from haforat nedarim (annulment of vows) despite the principle that mamona mi'issura lo yalfinan (we don't derive monetary laws from prohibition-based laws). The Gemara's conclusion, however, is that kiddushin is indeed mamona—specifically, a kinyan (acquisition) that creates ownership rights over the woman. This is not merely about the money of kiddushin but about the cheftza (essence) of kiddushin itself being an act of ownership.
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Kiddushin 4a
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