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The Gemara (גמרא) asks whether kiddushin requires lishmah by comparing two hekeshim: havaya leYetziya (get) and havaya laDodi (money). Why aren't these contradictory? The shiur resolves this by distinguishing between ritual requirements (like lishmah in get) and kinyan requirements (transaction aspects). Shtar kiddushin may involve both elements, but kesef kiddushin is purely a kinyan and thus doesn't require lishmah.
Rabbi Zweig analyzes a fundamental question in Kiddushin 9b regarding the apparent contradiction between two hekeshim (textual comparisons). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether kiddushin requires lishmah (intent for the specific purpose) by comparing havaya (marriage) leYetziya (to divorce/get) versus havaya laDodi (to money). The question is: if we learn from get that shtar kiddushin needs lishmah, why don't we then learn from shtar to kesef that kesef also needs lishmah? The central insight is that these hekeshim don't mean the laws of one kinyan automatically transfer to another. Rather, makish havaya laDodi teaches us that the fundamental nature of kiddushin is a kinyan (acquisition), not a religious ritual. Meanwhile, makish havaya leYetziya indicates that shtar kiddushin also has ritual aspects because we learn the primary din of shtar from get.
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Kiddushin 9b
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