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How does dalet amos function when delivering a get in reshus harabim, and why does the Rambam (רמב"ם) rule megureshes midoraisa before the woman picks it up? The shiur distinguishes between "space" (one's dalet amos as a Torah (תורה) concept of personal domain) and "ownership" (formal kinyan), arguing that the sugya addresses lo nafak yado—not kinyan derabanan—and that kedei shetifshot is considered "in her hand" midoraisa. This resolves the apparent contradictions in the Rambam's rulings.
The shiur addresses a fundamental problem in understanding the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s rulings in Hilchos Gerushin regarding how dalet amos functions in reshus harabim when delivering a get. The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 78b presents multiple interpretations of "karov lo" (close to her): dalet amos, kedei shetifshot (within reach to bend and pick up), and various scenarios of who can watch the get. Tosafos (תוספות) asks: if the Chachamim did not institute dalet amos as a kinyan in reshus harabim, how can the Mishna say she is megureshes in reshus harabim without her actually picking up the get? The Rambam's position appears contradictory. In Hilchos Gezeilah (Perek 7, Halacha (הלכה) 8), the Rambam rules that dalet amos does not work in reshus harabim—there is no kinyan through dalet amos in a public domain. Yet in Hilchos Gerushin (Perek 5, Halachos 11-12), the Rambam rules twice that when a get lands within a woman's dalet amos in reshus harabim, she is megureshes midoraisa before she even picks it up. The first case discusses when both can watch it versus when only she can watch it. The second case discusses whose dalet amos it landed in. How can the Rambam hold both positions?
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Gittin 78b
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