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Why can't a woman be mekadesh with an object worth less than a shaveh pruta? The shiur analyzes the machlokes Rishonim on whether kiddushin requires actual kesef (an object worth a pruta now) or mere value/benefit. Tosfos and the Rambam (רמב"ם) hold kiddushin demands a ma'aseh—a real cheifetz of kesef—while the Rashba and Geonim view it as an agreement satisfied by future benefit.
This shiur, the second in a series on the concept of shaveh kesef in kiddushin, delves into the machlokes Rishonim regarding whether a woman can be mekadesh with an object worth less than a shaveh pruta. Rabbi Zweig begins by resolving the Atzmus Yosef's question on Tosfos: Tosfos holds that shaveh kesef has two deficiencies—it is not an actual object of kesef, and it lacks absolute value (shavius). The Rashba's innovation is that even pachas m'shaveh pruta has value because of its future benefit (ishtamchus), but Tosfos requires an actual ma'aseh kiddushin, which demands a real cheifetz of kesef now, not future benefit. The shiur then explores a three-way machlokes among the Rishonim regarding whether a kli worth less than a shaveh pruta is valid for mo'adeh b'miktzas (partial admission). The Ramban (רמב"ן) holds one needs two prutas' worth of kelim. The Geonim hold that any kelim suffice, regardless of value. The Rashba introduces a third position: even a kli worth less than a pruta in market value is considered worth a pruta because of its future utility (ishtamchus).
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Kiddushin 2a
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