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Why isn't a single witness believed against a chezkas issur? The Gemara (גמרא) establishes this rule but seems to contradict it with cases like hafrashas terumah and nikar hagid. The shiur develops the fundamental machlokes between the Taz and Shach: does "k'neged chezkas issur" mean an eid cannot change a thing's legal status from assur to mutar, or that an eid cannot testify that a ma'aseh happened?
The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 2b discusses the principle of eid echad neeman be'isurin—that a single witness is believed regarding matters of issur and heter. The Gemara states that if one holds ein biyado lishmo (that one cannot write a get for a specific purpose without authorization), then one should require two witnesses based on the principle of eid echad neeman be'isurin, which operates k'neged chezkas issur—against an established presumption of prohibition. Rashi (רש"י) explains this concept by citing four cases where an eid echad is believed: hafrashas terumah (separating tithes), shechitah (ritual slaughter), and nikar hagid hanasheh (removal of the sciatic nerve), plus one more. However, the Gemara then states that where there is chezkas issur, the witness is not believed. Rashi asks why terumah and shechitah don't constitute proofs against this rule, since in those cases biyodo letaken—it was within the person's power to fix the problem. The key question emerges: why does Rashi only ask this question from terumah and shechitah, and not from nikar hagid, which also appears to be a case of eid echad k'neged chezkas issur?
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Gittin 2b
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