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Why isn't a single witness believed against a chezkas issur? The Gemara (גמרא) establishes this rule but seems to contradict it with cases like hafrashas terumah and nikar hagid. The shiur develops the fundamental machlokes between the Taz and Shach: does "k'neged chezkas issur" mean an eid cannot change a thing's legal status from assur to mutar, or that an eid cannot testify that a ma'aseh happened?
The Gemara (גמרא) in Gittin 2b discusses the principle of eid echad neeman be'isurin—that a single witness is believed regarding matters of issur and heter. The Gemara states that if one holds ein biyado lishmo (that one cannot write a get for a specific purpose without authorization), then one should require two witnesses based on the principle of eid echad neeman be'isurin, which operates k'neged chezkas issur—against an established presumption of prohibition. Rashi (רש"י) explains this concept by citing four cases where an eid echad is believed: hafrashas terumah (separating tithes), shechitah (ritual slaughter), and nikar hagid hanasheh (removal of the sciatic nerve), plus one more. However, the Gemara then states that where there is chezkas issur, the witness is not believed. Rashi asks why terumah and shechitah don't constitute proofs against this rule, since in those cases biyodo letaken—it was within the person's power to fix the problem. The key question emerges: why does Rashi only ask this question from terumah and shechitah, and not from nikar hagid, which also appears to be a case of eid echad k'neged chezkas issur?
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Gittin 2b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
