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If someone pays off another's debt without being asked, can he collect from the debtor? The Gemara (גמרא) distinguishes mavri achari (removing a lion) from actual payment. Where you merely persuade the creditor not to collect—without truly paying the debtor's obligation—there's no hanah given and no legal obligation created, even though the debtor benefits enormously.
The shiur focuses on a fundamental question in the laws of debt payment and benefit: when a third party pays off someone else's debt (parei achov), under what circumstances can he collect from the debtor? The Gemara (גמרא) introduces the concept of "mavri achari" (chasing away the lion) as distinct from actually paying off a debt, and this distinction has profound implications for both monetary law and the laws of nedarim. The Gemara discusses Tosfos's two approaches to resolving why parei achov might not create a legal obligation. The first teretz suggests that the entire din of parei achov applies only to mezonos ishto (a wife's support), not to regular debts, because mezonos ishto is not considered borei hazeka. The second teretz argues that even a regular debt is not borei hazeka because the debtor might have been able to get mechilah (forgiveness) from the creditor through friends or personal appeal. Rabbi Zweig examines why this seemingly unlikely possibility would eliminate the legal obligation to repay.
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Nedarim 33a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
