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Why is the master exempt when his slave damages and claims "he told me to do it"? The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s formulation reveals a fundamental sevarah: the slave is a bar da'as with his own agenda—potentially acting to spite his master rather than obey him. This independent motive (kavana shel hazik) breaks the chain of attributing the act to the master. In theft cases, the Rambam adds a takana: though the slave has no kinyan hageneivah now, once freed he must pay kefel, creating deterrent consequences that prevent exploitation of his protected status.
The shiur examines the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of an eved (slave) who causes damage and claims his master instructed him to do so. The core question is whether the master is liable when the eved acts as his agent. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that the master is exempt (patur) and the discussion centers on understanding the conceptual basis for this exemption. Rabbi Zweig begins by contrasting two areas of halacha (הלכה). In Hilchos Chavalah (damages), the Rambam writes that the eved is immediately obligated to pay (chayav miyad), though collection is deferred until he is freed. In Hilchos Genevah (theft), however, the Rambam states "mishtacher ha-eved chayav l'shalem" (when freed, the slave is obligated to pay), without establishing an immediate obligation. This distinction is puzzling: if the underlying principle is the same, why does the Rambam formulate the two cases differently?
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Bava Kamma 3b-4a
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What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
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