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What makes pilagesh different from kiddushin? The Rambam (רמב"ם) holds pilagesh requires a kinyan through yichud but not commitment to nisuin, while kadesha involves no kinyan at all. This explains why the Rambam introduces the concept in Hilchos Ishus: without kiddushin protecting a woman, even exclusive relationships constitute kadesha.
This shiur addresses fundamental questions in the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of pilagesh and kiddushin. The central problem is why the Rambam begins Hilchos Ishus by discussing the history of pilagesh (concubinage), which seems to belong in Hilchos Issurei Biah rather than Hilchos Kiddushin. Additionally, the Rambam's statement that a woman who is meyuchedes (exclusive) to one man without kiddushin violates the prohibition of kadesha contradicts the Raavad, who argues that exclusivity itself removes the kadesha prohibition. The shiur proposes that pilagesh requires a kinyan, not merely an exclusive relationship. The Rambam states that pilagesh is "konah osah b'yichud bilvad" (acquires her through yichud alone). This language indicates ownership, not just going steady. The source for this kinyan is found in the Ramban (רמב"ן) and Ridvaz, who explain that chuppah can be made before erusin. This demonstrates that yichud itself constitutes a kinyan allowing one to live with a woman, separate from the kinyan kiddushin that creates the status of arusah.
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Kiddushin 2a
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