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Why does the Mishna not list all the intermediate levels of kedusha—neviim, kesuvim, chumashim—when permitting the sale of a mitpachas to buy seforim? The shiur distinguishes between kedushas ha-cheifetz (the intrinsic holiness of an object, governed by Hilchos Sefer Torah (תורה)) and kedushas Beis HaKnesses (holiness derived from communal ownership and use). This dual framework resolves the Tur and Magen Avrohom's questions and illuminates the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s insistence on "bnei ha'ir" language.
The shiur opens with a fundamental question posed by the Tur and Beis Yosef on the Mishna in Megillah that permits selling a mitpachas (mantle) to buy seforim. According to Rashi (רש"י), "seforim" means Neviim and Kesuvim; according to the Rambam (רמב"ם), it means chumashim. Both Rishonim agree that the kedusha hierarchy is clear: chumashim have greater kedusha than neviim and kesuvim, and neviim/kesuvim are holier than a mitpachas (which has only tashmishei kedusha). If so, why doesn't the Mishna explicitly state the intermediate step—that one may sell mitpachas for neviim/kesuvim, and neviim/kesuvim for chumashim? The Tur and Beis Yosef note that the Gemara (גמרא) elsewhere rules that one may not place neviim and kesuvim on top of chumashim, demonstrating that chumashim are kodesh yoser. This same question troubles the Magen Avrohom in Orach Chaim: the Shulchan Aruch appears to equate all three categories (chumashim, neviim, kesuvim) in terms of mechirah, yet the Ran explicitly rules that neviim are holier than kesuvim (hence the order of pesukim in the Rosh Hashanah mussaf: kesuvim, then neviim—ma'alin bakodesh). How can the halacha (הלכה) of mechirah ignore these distinctions? Rabbi Zweig presents the Chasam Sofer's resolution: in kedusha, neviim and kesuvim are equal, while chumashim possess a higher kedusha because they can be assembled into a Sefer Torah (תורה) (kedusha ba-geviyah). However, the din of mechirah is not driven by kedushas ha-cheifetz but by the mitzvah (מצוה) one can perform with the object. For purposes of Talmud (תלמוד) Torah, chumashim, neviim, kesuvim, and even sifrei meforshim are equivalent—all facilitate the mitzvah of limud ha-Torah. Therefore, there is no ma'alin bakodesh between them with respect to mechirah. Only a Sefer Torah, which is used for krias ha-Torah b'rabbim (a public communal mitzvah), stands higher in this respect. The Chasam Sofer acknowledges that this approach fits the Rambam's framework (where the primary concern is the mitzvah, not the intrinsic sanctity of the object) but is harder to reconcile with the Ran's view that the prohibition is based on kedushas ha-domem (the inherent holiness of the item).
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Megillah 25b
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