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Why does the Mishna describe marriage with the language of kinyan (acquisition) rather than kiddushin (sanctification)? The Gemara (גמרא) reveals that kesef-marriage is fundamentally a kinyan transaction learned from "yotzei chinam ein kesef," while shtar and bi'ah create holy matrimony. This distinction explains why Chazal can be mafkir kiddushei kesef but not other forms.
This Gemara (גמרא) shiur analyzes the opening contradiction on Kiddushin 2a between the language of "isha niknis" (a woman is acquired) in the first Mishna and "ish mekadesh" (a man sanctifies) in the second Mishna. The fundamental question is whether marriage should be characterized as a business relationship (kinyan) or as holy matrimony (kiddushin). The Gemara presents two possible approaches to understanding this contradiction. One approach treats this as purely a linguistic issue: both formulations are appropriate, and we simply need to understand why different language is used in different contexts. The alternative approach views the language of kinyan as inherently inappropriate and demeaning for marriage—once we know marriage is kiddushin (sanctification), it seems wrong to describe it in business terms.
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Kiddushin 2a
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