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Why does the Mishna say "isha niknes la'baal" rather than simply "isha niknes"? The shiur explores how Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafos (תוספות) learn that the Mishna discusses marriage proper (nisuin), not pilegesh. The key is that marriage requires a mindset of permanent commitment (l'isa osa), and kiddushin becomes a prerequisite for that nisuin—not merely a technical kinyan.
This shiur on Kiddushin 2a begins with a fundamental question: Why does Rashi (רש"י) explain "isha niknes" as "isha niknes la'ba'ala"—the woman is acquired to her husband? The entire Mishna seems to demand clarification of what exactly is being taught, and what differentiates marriage from other relationships like pilegesh (concubine). Rabbi Zweig develops the approach of Tosafos (תוספות), who states that "isha mevoreres b'kra"—the woman mentioned in the Mishna is the woman mentioned in the Torah (תורה) regarding nisuin (full marriage). Tosafos is puzzled why we need the extra "hei" (letter) in the Mishna's formulation, and explores whether the Mishna is drawing its language from the pesukim discussing actual marriage or from kiddushin (betrothal). The Rishonim spend extensive ink analyzing this seemingly minor textual detail, which signals that they are uncovering something fundamental about the nature of marriage.
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Kiddushin 2a
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