No community start suggestion yet.
What distinguishes kibush yachid (individual conquest) from kibush rabbim (communal conquest), and why does Syria have some laws of Eretz Yisrael but not others? The Rambam (רמב"ם) identifies two separate issues: yishuv (Jewish settlement) and kedushah (holiness for terumah/ma'aser). Syria has kedushah but lacks the din of yishuv because Dovid HaMelech conquered it for royal revenue, not for settling the Jewish people.
This shiur undertakes a detailed analysis of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s treatment of kibush yachid (conquest by an individual, specifically King Dovid) versus kibush rabbim (conquest by the Jewish people collectively), focusing on the unique halachic status of Syria. The shiur addresses fundamental contradictions in the Rambam's presentation and proposes that the Rambam is addressing two entirely separate legal frameworks. The shiur begins with an apparent contradiction in the Kesef Mishneh's commentary on the Rambam. In one halacha (הלכה), the Kesef Mishneh explains that kibush yachid is not considered a true kibush because it was not done "kidat rov Yisrael" (according to the majority of Israel), citing the Gemara (גמרא) in Avodah Zarah as his source. Yet in the very next halacha, the Rambam explains that Syria lacks full Eretz Yisrael status for a different reason: because it was conquered shaloh keseder (out of order—before the conquest of Canaan was complete), citing this from the Gemara in Gittin. This appears contradictory: why does the Rambam give two different explanations for the same phenomenon?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 8a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
