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When a thief confesses without witnesses, he pays keren but not kefel (double payment). Does Beis Din believe his confession that he actually stole, or do they merely accept his monetary obligation? Rashi (רש"י) understands that we believe the confession of the act of theft itself (marshe'a atzmo), making him liable for keren as a ganav, but the Torah (תורה) requires witnesses for kefel. The Rambam (רמב"ם) may hold differently—either treating it as pure monetary obligation without believing the theft occurred, or recognizing that since kefel is the standard consequence of theft, a confession without witnesses doesn't create a distinct category of nezek.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Bava Kamma 4b regarding the principle of modeh b'knas—when someone confesses to a theft for which he would owe a fine (knas) but lacks witnesses. The Gemara (גמרא) establishes that such a person pays keren (the principal value) but is exempt from kefel (the double payment that the Torah (תורה) imposes on a thief). Rabbi Zweig explores the fundamental question: What exactly does Beis Din believe when the thief confesses? The shiur opens with a practical discussion of the two schools of thought regarding what constitutes theft. One view holds that taking something permanently constitutes geneivah; another holds that even borrowing without permission with intent to return it is theft. This leads to questions about how Beis Din could ever prove intent—does the burden of proof lie on the prosecution to show the thief intended to use the item, or can the defendant claim he never intended to use it and thereby escape liability for kefel?
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Bava Kamma 4b
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