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If Adam couldn't eat any meat, why did he need a separate prohibition against Ever Min HaChai? Tosafot distinguishes between killing animals (forbidden to Adam) and eating naturally dead meat (permitted), making Ever Min HaChai necessary for limbs that fall off living animals. The Rambam (רמב"ם) takes a unified approach: 'Achol Tochel' established one principle of eating only what's designated as food.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of the complex commentaries of Rashi (רש"י) and Tosafot on Sanhedrin 56b regarding the prohibition of Ever Min HaChai (eating a limb from a living animal). The Gemara (גמרא) derives this prohibition from the verse 'Achol Tochel' given to Adam, interpreting it to mean 'eat what is ready for food' - excluding living animals whose purpose is reproduction, not consumption. Tosafot raises a fundamental question: if Adam was already prohibited from eating any meat (as the Gemara states elsewhere), why was an additional prohibition of Ever Min HaChai necessary? This seems redundant. The shiur explores Tosafot's resolution that Adam's meat prohibition was specifically against killing animals for food, but meat that died naturally would have been permitted. Therefore, the Ever Min HaChai prohibition was needed to forbid limbs that fell off living animals naturally.
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Sanhedrin 56b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
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