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What distinguishes nolad from muktzeh? The shiur develops Tosfos's position that nolad is not merely a question of kavana (mental preparation) but a halachic requirement—can hachana be chal on something not yet in the world? Tosfos identifies two types of nolad: objects here in a different form (shivrei keilim) versus objects not here at all (mayim be'av), and argues beitzah is judged by whether it's considered "here" through the mother's potential shechita.
This shiur explores Masechta Beitzah 2a-b, focusing on Tosfos's complex treatment of the relationship between muktzeh and nolad. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether an egg laid on Yom Tov is permitted, and the shiur analyzes how Tosfos distinguishes between different categories of nolad (newly-created items) and their muktzeh status according to Rav Shimon. The shiur begins by reviewing the Gemara's question: if the issue with an egg laid on Yom Tov is that it's nolad, why doesn't the same problem apply to shivrei keilim (broken utensils)? Tosfos addresses this by distinguishing between types of nolad. Shivrei keilim are items that existed beforehand but changed form—they were here in the world. Rainwater (mayim be'av mivlablia), by contrast, is something that wasn't in the world at all. Rabbi Zweig explains that Tosfos is establishing a fundamental distinction: muktzeh relates to whether one had kavana (mental preparation) for an item, but nolad raises a different question—can halachic preparation (hachana) take effect on something that doesn't yet exist in the world?
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Beitzah 2a-b
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Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
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