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What qualifies as valid language for kiddushin? The shiur analyzes whether terms like "miyuchedes li" and "m'ureches li" describe the *process* of marriage or its *result*, and whether "asukim b'oso inyan" (being engaged in discussion of that topic) transforms ambiguous language into binding kiddushin language. A fundamental debate emerges: does the Gemara (גמרא)'s concept of asukim merely preserve continuity of intent, or does it convert non-kiddushin terms into actual lashon kiddushin?
The shiur opens with a case from the Shulchan Aruch: if a man says "harei at ishti" (behold you are my wife) and the woman claims she did not understand what that meant, what is the law? The Mechaber rules she is mekudeshes; the Rama, citing the Ran and Rava Maggid, says only if "hivina devarav"—she understood—is she mekudeshes. Rabbi Zweig notes that the Rambam (רמב"ם) brings this halacha (הלכה) without qualification, suggesting a more complex underlying principle. Similarly, in the case of "mi'uchedes li" (designated for me), which the Gemara (גמרא) treats as a safek kiddushin when it is "sukim b'oso inyan" (engaged in that topic), Rabbi Zweig asks: if she says "I thought it meant work," shouldn't she be believed to say it's *not* kiddushin, just as she is believed when she says she didn't understand "harei at ishti"? Yet the Rambam does not say this. The Gemara in Kiddushin 6a presents two sets of expressions. The first set—"harei at ishti," "harei at arusasi," "harei at k'nuyali," "harei at sheli," "harei at p'rusasi," "harei at ts'kukali"—are vadai kiddushin. The second set—"miyuchedes li," "m'ureches li," "atzurosi," etc.—are all safek. Rabbi Zweig asks: what distinguishes these two groups? He suggests the first six describe the *process* of kiddushin—the act of being mekadesh—while the second set describes the *result* or *consequence* of kiddushin. This fits with the Gemara's earlier principle (from daf 5b) that language describing the woman being koneh the man is invalid, but language describing the man being koneh the woman is valid.
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Kiddushin 6a
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