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Why is milah on the eighth day permitted on Shabbos (שבת), but not on later days? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s formulation about "ashe shelo" and the Gemara (גמרא)'s answer involving thirteen covenants. The key distinction emerges between the mitzvah (מצוה) of milah itself and the special mitzvah of Yom HaShmini, with implications for the entire logic of binyan av when learning out that positive commandments override negative ones.
This shiur on Yevamos 5b focuses on a fundamental question in the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of which positive commandments override negative prohibitions. The opening challenge is understanding Rashi (רש"י)'s language: when explaining why milah overrides Shabbos (שבת), Rashi says "mimila shelo" – from the accomplishment of milah. What does "ashe shelo" add that the word "milah" alone wouldn't convey? Rabbi Zweig explains that Rashi is distinguishing between milah as a mitzvah (מצוה) and the specific mitzvah of performing milah on Yom HaShmini (the eighth day). Milah itself, when performed not at its proper time (shelo bizmanah), does not override Shabbos. It's specifically the mitzvah ashe of performing milah on the eighth day that is docheh (overrides) Shabbos. This leads to examining why the Gemara says that on Yom HaShmini, milah was "nichras alah yud gimel brisos" (established with thirteen covenants).
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Yevamos 5b
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