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Can a person make a valid shevua on a mitzvah (מצוה) they're already obligated to fulfill? The Ran distinguishes between an imposed obligation and a personal commitment—arguing that mushba ve'omed me'Har Sinai creates not merely punishment for violation but an intrinsic obligation. The shiur develops the Gemara (גמרא)'s teretz of la'zaruza nafshe as establishing a din shevua for zrizus (enthusiastic fulfillment), not merely bal yachel or zahirus.
This advanced shiur analyzes a complex sugya in Nedarim 8a concerning the nature of vows made upon mitzvos. Rabbi Zweig explores the Ran's difficult approach to understanding the Gemara (גמרא)'s question "halo mushba ve'omed me'Har Sinai"—why can't one make a shevua on a mitzvah (מצוה) when we are already obligated from Sinai? The foundational question is why Rav Gidal Amar Rav brings a pasuk from Tehillim "nishbati va'akayma lishmore mishpetei tzidkecha" to teach that there is a mitzvah to make a vow on mitzvos. The Gemara's question "halo mushba ve'omed me'Har Sinai" seems to contradict this, suggesting that since we're already obligated, no additional vow can take effect. The Ran learns that the Gemara's havamina was that Rav Gidal held it to be a full-fledged shevua, which couldn't work due to mushba ve'omed, and the Gemara could have simply answered that it's only nogeia for bal yachel but not for korban.
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Nedarim 8a
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