No community start suggestion yet.
Why is an egg laid on Yom Tov permitted according to the Gemara (גמרא)'s conclusion? The shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute between Rashi (רש"י) and the Ran: Rashi understands muktzeh as a question of mental preparation (hachana), while the Ran defines it as whether something has the status of food (ochel). The Maharsha's resolution to Tosafos (תוספות)' difficulty emerges from this conceptual divide.
The shiur opens with a complex analysis of Beitzah 2a, focusing on the fundamental question of why an egg laid on Yom Tov would be permitted. The Gemara (גמרא)'s inquiry revolves around two potential prohibitions: muktzeh (set-aside items) and nolad (newly created items). Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות)' question: if the reason the egg is permitted is because "dibui shocheit v'ochol kol shebegava" (one could theoretically slaughter the mother), then what about Shabbos (שבת), where slaughter is prohibited? The Maharsha addresses this by distinguishing between types of muktzeh—specifically, muktzeh machmas gufo versus muktzeh because of external factors.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Beitzah 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
