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Does something that comes from muktze itself become muktze? The shiur analyzes a fundamental dispute between the Ran and Baal HaMaor on Beitzah 2a regarding whether eggs laid on Yom Tov are forbidden due to muktze or nolad, and whether having intent (das) the day before removes the prohibition.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Beitzah 2a, focusing on the complex positions of the Ran and Baal HaMaor regarding eggs laid on Yom Tov and the fundamental principles of muktze and nolad. The discussion begins with a difficulty in Tosfos, who explains that according to Beis Shammai, shells and peels (klipan) that are fit only for animal consumption (muchan lebehema) are sufficient to avoid muktze, while Beis Hillel requires that items be fit for human consumption (muchan le'adam). Rabbi Zweig questions how this fits with the argument of the Baal HaMaor, who claims this machlokes parallels the Mishna's dispute about muktze generally. The shiur resolves this by explaining that according to Tosfos, being muchan lebehema doesn't constitute actual hachana (preparation) for human use. Rather, it merely removes the category of muktze machmas gufo (intrinsically set-aside items like stones). Beis Shammai holds there's no requirement of hachana at all, but still forbids items that have no use whatsoever—even for animals. Being fit for animal consumption doesn't make something "prepared," but it does prevent it from being categorized as completely useless.
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Beitzah 2a
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