A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
What does it mean to say an object is "worth" five sela'im for pidyon haben when it's not worth that in the marketplace? The shiur unpacks three readings of "didi shovei" (it's worth to me) from the gemara (גמרא): actual market value, subjective preference, or the relational generosity of a gavar rabbah. The Rambam (רמב"ם)'s ruling sheds light on whether the kohen must receive objective market value or whether subjective worth—even when no money changes hands—suffices to effectuate the mitzvah (מצוה).
Rabbi Zweig examines Kiddushin 8a, focusing on the gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of pidyon haben and the concept of *didi shovei* ("it's worth to me"). The gemara addresses whether an object given to a kohen for pidyon haben needs a formal appraisal (*shuma*). Rav Yosef derives from a braisa that shuma is required: if a man says an eagle is worth five sela'im and the kohen accepts it, even though it's not actually worth five, the pidyon is valid. The gemara challenges and clarifies the case, establishing that we're dealing with an object not worth five in the marketplace, yet accepted by the kohen as if it were. The gemara brings two stories involving Rav Kahana and sudras (scarves) to illustrate when such a transaction works. The key phrase is *hani mili b'gavar rabbah*—this works specifically with a "great man." The gemara indicates that the kohen must be someone who would actually pay five sela'im for the item. The Rambam (רמב"ם) codifies this halacha (הלכה) but omits the requirement that the kohen be a gavar rabbah, simply stating that if the object isn't worth five in the market but the kohen accepts it as worth five, the pidyon is valid.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Kiddushin 8a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
