No community start suggestion yet.
Why is one witness believed for matters of issur when davar she'b'ervah normally requires two? The shiur develops Tosfos's chakira distinguishing between creating an issur (requires two) and removing one (one suffices), applying this to the case of writing a get lishmah. The Gemara (גמרא)'s answer of chazak issur redefines whether the witness is eid kiyum or eid birur.
This shiur provides an in-depth analysis of Tosfos on Gittin 2a regarding the principle of eid echad ne'eman b'isurin (one witness is believed regarding prohibitions). The Gemara (גמרא) discusses whether one witness suffices for testifying that a get was written lishmah (for the sake of the specific woman being divorced), even though davar she'b'ervah (matters of forbidden relationships) typically requires two witnesses. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining the apparent contradiction between Tosfos and the Rosh. Tosfos holds that it is harder to permit (le'hatir) than to prohibit (le'aser), meaning one witness suffices to create a prohibition but not to remove one. The Rosh takes the opposite position, stating it is harder to prohibit than to permit. Rabbi Zweig develops a resolution showing these are not contradictory but address different aspects of testimony.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 2a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
