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Does safek d'oraisa l'chumra mean we assume the stringent position is true, or merely that we cannot take a chance when in doubt? The shiur explores this fundamental chakira through the Gemara (גמרא) in Nedarim 7a, analyzing the Ran's position on safek stok and examining whether ein hekesh l'maase creates a true safek in the yud gimel midos or a safek in application.
This shiur on Nedarim 7a presents a fundamental chakira in understanding the principle of safek d'oraisa l'chumra. Rabbi Zweig challenges the Ran's approach to a case involving safek stok (doubtful vow), questioning whether the safek is truly a safek makom (uncertainty of fact) or a safek in the application of the yud gimel midos ha'Torah (תורה) (thirteen hermeneutical principles). The central question is whether safek d'oraisa l'chumra means the Torah mandates that we assume the stringent position is correct, or whether it merely means we are prohibited from taking a chance when uncertain. This distinction has major practical ramifications. If safek means we assume the chumra, then in cases of safek nedarim during bein hashemoshos (twilight), we would have to assume it is already the next day, potentially allowing a father to annul his daughter's vow even during the period of doubt. The Raavad's position on safek brachos (that one recites a blessing even in doubt because one must fulfill the mitzvah (מצוה)) reflects the assumption approach. However, if safek merely means we cannot take chances, then the doubt remains unresolved, and different consequences follow.
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Nedarim 7a
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