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What happens when someone makes a neder (vow) using the language of shevuah (oath), or vice versa? The shiur analyzes the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s understanding that both nedarim and shevuos are fundamentally commitments in Parshas Matos—the key difference being that neder creates an issur cheftza (prohibition on the object) while shevuah creates only an issur gavra (prohibition on the person). This yesod resolves why neder b'lashon shevuah creates only an issur gavra, not a full neder.
This shiur explores the opening sugya of Masechta Nedarim (2a) focusing on the halachic mechanics of making a neder using the language of a shevuah, or making a shevuah using the language of a neder. Rabbi Zweig develops a foundational understanding of the Rambam (רמב"ם)'s shita on the relationship between nedarim and shevuos. The shiur begins with a Rambam in Hilchos Nezirus that if someone says "I am a nazir only from the seeds or pits" or "from figs," he is forbidden in those things but is not a nazir. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a machlokes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding someone who says "I am a nazir from grapes" (something a nazir is not commanded about). Beis Shammai says he is a nazir; Beis Hillel says he is not. The Gemara states this Mishna is not like Rabbi Nosson, who holds that according to Beis Shammai he is both a nazir and a nadir on grapes, while according to Beis Hillel he is a nadir on grapes but not a nazir.
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Nedarim 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
