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Can a man betroth a woman by extending the due date of a loan she owes him? The Gemara (גמרא) raises the problem of *milvah lo nitna* — the money already belongs to her, so nothing is being given. Rashi (רש"י) and the Rambam (רמב"ם) disagree fundamentally on how to understand *hana'ah* versus *service*, and the Raavad introduces the critical condition that the money must be physically in her hand.
The shiur analyzes a difficult sugya in Kiddushin 6b concerning betrothal through the extension of a loan. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a case where a man lent money to a woman and, when the loan comes due, he extends the repayment period and declares that she is betrothed to him with the value she receives from this extension. The fundamental problem is *milvah lo nitna* — the money is already hers, so extending the due date does not constitute giving her anything new. The Rambam (רמב"ם) in Hilchos Ishus holds that this type of kiddushin does not work because one cannot betroth with pure *hana'ah* (benefit). The Rambam maintains that betrothal requires an actual transfer of value, and mere benefit from forgiveness or extension of debt does not qualify. This appears to contradict other Gemaras that allow betrothal through *hana'ah*, such as when a man says he will speak to the authorities on her behalf or dance at her wedding.
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Kiddushin 6b
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