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Does the requirement to say "b'fanai nechtav u'b'fanai nechtam" include testifying to lishmah, or is it merely about witnessing the physical act of writing? The shiur analyzes the Ramban (רמב"ן) and Rashba's fundamental machloket: whether lishmah is an integral quality of the writing itself (such that a get not written lishmah is not considered "written" at all), or whether lishmah is a separate halachic requirement distinct from the act of writing.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Gittin 5b-6a, focusing on the requirement of lishmah (proper intent) in writing a get and the testimony required when delivering it. The Gemara (גמרא) discusses a dispute between Rav Achai, who requires the witness to have seen every letter (kol os v'os), and Rav Ami/Rav Assi, who do not require this level of scrutiny. Rav Elazar holds that even if only one line was written lishmah in the witness's presence, it is sufficient. The shiur identifies a fundamental difficulty: we pasken like Rava that the reason for b'fanai nechtav u'b'fanai nechtam is not lishmah but rather adam atzo m'kayeim (a person cannot authenticate his own document). If so, what is the function of requiring testimony beyond the basic b'fanai nechtam? Why would Rav Achai require seeing all the letters, and why would the Gemara mention lishmah at all?
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Gittin 5b-6a
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