A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How can a ganav sell what isn't his? The shiur develops two approaches to Bava Kamma 58a. One possibility: a ganav can sell kinyan genevah itself—not the object, but his property right that crystallizes upon shinui. Alternatively, the Torah (תורה) requires only a ma'aseh mechirah—an act resembling sale—making shoneh bechet the irreversibility of the transfer, not the change in ownership.
This shiur examines the machlokes between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheish on Bava Kamma 58a regarding tavach u'machar—when a ganav slaughters and sells a stolen animal. The fundamental question is how mechirah works when the object doesn't belong to the seller. Rav Nachman says one is chayav even for mechirah le'achrayus (a sale for value afterward), while Rav Sheish says patur unless it's a hanu me'isa (benefit to the thief now). Rashi (רש"י) explains that selling for thirty days is kasheirus ba'alma, not a full mechirah. The shiur presents a foundational difficulty: the Torah (תורה) says "machar"—there must be a mechirah. Yet a ganav cannot effectuate a real mechirah of an object that doesn't belong to him. Even without a pasuk to be marbeh, how could there be any mechirah at all? The Gemara (גמרא)'s statement that mechirah must be "ein chozer" (irreversible) requires explanation—why does this need to be learned from a hekesh to tvicha?
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Bava Kamma 58a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
