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Why is someone liable for fire damage when the animal or object is on the other side of a wall? The shiur analyzes the fundamental dispute between Rabbeinu Tam and the Rambam (רמב"ם) regarding whether the Mishna's liability turns on the concept of "tamun" (concealment) or simply "eino darko" (not its usual place). The analysis reveals opposing understandings of the Mishna's structure and the nafka mina regarding lighting in one's own field.
This shiur delivers an intensive analysis of Bava Kamma 22b, focusing on the Mishna's cases of fire liability when an eved (slave) and a g'di (young goat) are positioned in different configurations. The fundamental question is what determines liability: the location of the animal relative to the fire, and whether concepts of "tamun" (concealment) or "eino darko" (not its usual place) create exemptions. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Tosafos (תוספות)'s reading of the Mishna, which identifies three distinct cases rather than two. The first case: when the g'di is kafos (tied) and the eved is samuch (nearby), one is liable. The second case: when the eved is samuch and the g'di is samuch, one is exempt due to kam lei d'rabina (the principle that one punishment exempts from another). The third case: when both the eved and g'di are kafos, one is exempt despite the g'di being tied, again due to kam lei d'rabina. Tosafos struggles with why the Mishna needs to state the case of g'di kafos in the seifa when we already know from the reisha that g'di kafos creates liability.
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Bava Kamma 22b
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