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Can one make a neder or shevuah to perform a mitzvah (מצוה)? The Gemara (גמרא) on Nedarim 8a questions whether such a commitment violates "ein shevuah chal al shevuah" — you cannot layer a new oath atop a preexisting Divine obligation. The shiur explores the Ran's chakira between neder (object-based consecration) and shevuah (personal obligation), and unfolds the Rosh's novel conception that a neder of mitzvah is valid because it is a binding personal word, not an isur cheftza.
This shiur is an intensive analysis of Nedarim 8a, examining the Gemara (גמרא)'s question of ein shevuah chal al shevuah (one oath cannot take effect upon another oath) in the context of vows to perform mitzvos. The central issue is whether a person can make a neder or shevuah to perform a mitzvah (מצוה) when he is already Divinely obligated from Sinai (mushba v'omed me-Har Sinai). Rabbi Zweig opens by clarifying two distinct problems that might invalidate such a vow. First is the issue of lehatah or le-heitiv: a shevuah bitui requires an element of choice—something the person could do or refrain from doing. If one is already obligated in a mitzvah, there is no real choice, and the oath should not take effect. Second is the problem of ein shevuah chal al shevuah: even if there is theoretical choice (e.g., the person could exempt himself temporarily), the fulfillment of the neder or shevuah would simultaneously be the fulfillment of the mitzvah obligation. This creates a situation where the personal vow is layered upon the Divine "vow" from Sinai, which is forbidden.
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Nedarim 8a
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