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Can a Kohen return pidyon haben money or terumah to the father who gave it? The shiur analyzes when returning payment violates "shichas bris Levi" (desecrating the covenant with Levi). The Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction turns on whether the money was originally the giver's or became the Kohen's property, and what happens when it returns to the original owner.
This shiur examines the complex halachic question of when a Kohen may return money or gifts he has received as pidyon haben or terumah, focusing on the prohibition of "shichas bris Levi"—desecrating the covenant with the tribe of Levi. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 29a-b discusses whether a Kohen can return what he has received and under what circumstances this would be permitted. The fundamental issue centers on payment mechanics. The Gemara cites the pasuk "Es kodesh b'nei Yisroel lo sechalelu" (you shall not desecrate the holy objects of the Jewish people) from Malachi, and connects it to another pasuk in the Torah (תורה): "Ki sechar lachem chalaf avodasechem" (for this is your wages in exchange for your service). The Kohanim's portions are characterized as wages earned for their service in the Beis Hamikdash. When a Kohen accepts payment for multiple obligations simultaneously—analogous to being paid for both working in a restaurant and painting a house with a single payment—it creates a problem of shichas bris Levi because it suggests he never really received wages for his Temple service at all.
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Kiddushin 29a-b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
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