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Can a Kohen return pidyon haben money or terumah to the father who gave it? The shiur analyzes when returning payment violates "shichas bris Levi" (desecrating the covenant with Levi). The Gemara (גמרא)'s distinction turns on whether the money was originally the giver's or became the Kohen's property, and what happens when it returns to the original owner.
This shiur examines the complex halachic question of when a Kohen may return money or gifts he has received as pidyon haben or terumah, focusing on the prohibition of "shichas bris Levi"—desecrating the covenant with the tribe of Levi. The Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin 29a-b discusses whether a Kohen can return what he has received and under what circumstances this would be permitted. The fundamental issue centers on payment mechanics. The Gemara cites the pasuk "Es kodesh b'nei Yisroel lo sechalelu" (you shall not desecrate the holy objects of the Jewish people) from Malachi, and connects it to another pasuk in the Torah (תורה): "Ki sechar lachem chalaf avodasechem" (for this is your wages in exchange for your service). The Kohanim's portions are characterized as wages earned for their service in the Beis Hamikdash. When a Kohen accepts payment for multiple obligations simultaneously—analogous to being paid for both working in a restaurant and painting a house with a single payment—it creates a problem of shichas bris Levi because it suggests he never really received wages for his Temple service at all.
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Kiddushin 29a-b
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