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When does bal tachel apply to nazirus? The Gemara (גמרא) on Nedarim 3b analyzes whether saying "kshertze" creates immediate nazirus obligations or merely a conditional commitment. Rashi (רש"י) and the Ran offer fundamentally different readings of the Gemara's answer, with major implications for when bal tachel begins.
This shiur presents a detailed analysis of Nedarim 3b, focusing on the sugya of bal tachel (the prohibition against delaying fulfillment of vows) as it applies to nazirus. The central question is: what type of nazirus obligation triggers bal tachel? The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where someone says "kshertze" (when I want) regarding nazirus. The fundamental question is whether this language means "when I want" (creating a definite obligation whose timing is self-determined) or "if I want" (creating only a conditional commitment). If it means "when I want," there should be bal tachel after three festivals, just as there would be if someone said "I will be a nazir in two years." But the Gemara seems to say there is no bal tachel in this case.
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Nedarim 3b
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