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When a man says "harei at mekudeshes li" to one woman and then "v'at" (and you) to another, is the second woman married? The word "at" could mean "at nami" (you too) or "at chazoi" (you will see [this one married]). The shiur analyzes whether yad (intimation) applies to kiddushin, examining Rishonim who debate whether this is a question of language or law.
This shiur provides a rigorous analysis of Nedarim 6b, focusing on the fundamental question of whether there exists a parasha (legal category) of yad l'kedushin—whether intimation or indirect language can create a valid marriage. The case under discussion involves a man who says "harei at mekudeshes li" (you are betrothed to me) to one woman and then says "v'at" (and you) to a second woman. The central question is whether the second woman is married. The Gemara (גמרא)'s framing of the question is whether yad works for kiddushin. The word "at" has two possible meanings: "at nami" (you too, i.e., you also are betrothed) or "at chazoi" (you will see [this one married]). While "at nami" is more likely the intended meaning, the possibility that it means "at chazoi" creates ambiguity. This ambiguity defines the term yad—language that could mean two things, where one meaning creates a legal effect and the other does not.
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Nedarim 6b
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