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Why doesn't the issur of nidah forever disqualify a yevamah from yibum, just as achos ishtoh does? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's comparison between these two ervos, exploring whether the mechanism that bars yibum is the ervah status itself or the creation of an eshes ach issur, and what distinguishes a relationship-specific issur from a universal one.
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of a Tosfos on Yevamos 2a that raises a fundamental question about the nature of ervah (forbidden relations) in the context of yibum (levirate marriage). The core problem Tosfos addresses is: why can a yevamah who was a nidah (menstruant) at the time of her husband's death later do yibum after she becomes tahor (ritually pure), whereas a woman who was achos ishtoh (sister of one's wife) at the moment of nefilah (when she fell to yibum) remains forever prohibited even after the sister dies? The shiur opens by framing Tosfos's question: both nidah and achos ishtoh are arayos (forbidden relations) punishable by kares. If achos ishtoh creates a permanent bar to yibum—even after the condition that made her an ervah (the sister being alive) no longer exists—then nidah should similarly create a permanent bar, even after she goes to the mikvah. Yet we know that a yevamah who was a nidah may do yibum once she is tahor. Tosfos answers that there is a fundamental distinction: achos ishtoh is an issur that is specific to the yavam (only he is forbidden to her as his wife's sister), whereas nidah is an issur that applies universally (she is forbidden to all men). This distinction, Tosfos suggests, is what determines whether the issur creates a permanent disability for yibum.
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Yevamos 2a
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