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Why doesn't the issur of nidah forever disqualify a yevamah from yibum, just as achos ishtoh does? The shiur analyzes Tosfos's comparison between these two ervos, exploring whether the mechanism that bars yibum is the ervah status itself or the creation of an eshes ach issur, and what distinguishes a relationship-specific issur from a universal one.
This shiur presents an intensive analysis of a Tosfos on Yevamos 2a that raises a fundamental question about the nature of ervah (forbidden relations) in the context of yibum (levirate marriage). The core problem Tosfos addresses is: why can a yevamah who was a nidah (menstruant) at the time of her husband's death later do yibum after she becomes tahor (ritually pure), whereas a woman who was achos ishtoh (sister of one's wife) at the moment of nefilah (when she fell to yibum) remains forever prohibited even after the sister dies? The shiur opens by framing Tosfos's question: both nidah and achos ishtoh are arayos (forbidden relations) punishable by kares. If achos ishtoh creates a permanent bar to yibum—even after the condition that made her an ervah (the sister being alive) no longer exists—then nidah should similarly create a permanent bar, even after she goes to the mikvah. Yet we know that a yevamah who was a nidah may do yibum once she is tahor. Tosfos answers that there is a fundamental distinction: achos ishtoh is an issur that is specific to the yavam (only he is forbidden to her as his wife's sister), whereas nidah is an issur that applies universally (she is forbidden to all men). This distinction, Tosfos suggests, is what determines whether the issur creates a permanent disability for yibum.
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Yevamos 2a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
