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What is the scope of taninim—raising objections on behalf of an absent defendant? The shiur distinguishes between taninim mezuyef (challenging authenticity) and taninim peruah (claiming payment), arguing that a mezuyef claim merely contests the proof, not the underlying obligation, whereas peruah has the force of a migu. Tosafot's progression through shtar kinyan and shtar rayah cases demonstrates that taninim applies even when only the proof—not the substantive claim—is challenged.
This shiur presents an intricate analysis of Tosafot on Gittin 2a concerning the principle of taninim—the court's raising of objections on behalf of an absent defendant. The opening question is why Tosafot introduces the concept of taninim at all when discussing whether a get can be declared mezuyef (forged). The shiur argues that taninim is not about the court's own doubts regarding the validity of a document; rather, it addresses whether the court must protect the absent party's rights by raising arguments he would have made if present. The shiur distinguishes sharply between two types of defensive claims: mezuyef (forgery) and peruah (payment). When a defendant claims peruah, he is not merely challenging the proof but asserting a substantive defense with the force of a migu—since he could have claimed mezuyef, his admission that the document is valid but paid gives his claim credibility. By contrast, a claim of mezuyef does not address the underlying obligation; it merely contests the proof. The defendant is saying "prove it," not "I don't owe." This distinction is critical: taninim peruah means the court would be ruling against someone who, if present, would prevail. Taninim mezuyef means only that the court cannot act without proof—but it does not mean the absent party has substantive equity on his side.
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Gittin 2a
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