A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
Is training a child to fast on Yom Kippur merely practice for adulthood, or does a katan have a rabbinic obligation in the mitzvah (מצוה) itself? The shiur analyzes the machloket between Rav Yochanan, Rav Huna, and Rav Chisda on whether sho'os (partial fasting) and hashlama (completing the fast) constitute chinuch d'Rabanan or simple preparation. The distinction reshapes when one must physically stop a child from eating and whether other inuyim apply.
This shiur explores a fundamental sugya in Yoma 82a concerning the obligation to train children (katanïm) to fast on Yom Kippur. The Gemara (גמרא) presents three opinions: Rav Chisda holds three years of training for a healthy child (bari) and two for a weak child (chola); Rav Huna holds two and two respectively; and Rav Yochanan holds that there is no rabbinic obligation of hashlama (completing the fast) at all—only sho'os (partial fasting) as preparation. Rabbi Zweig begins by framing the core question: What is the nature of this machloket? Is it a dispute about medical capacity—whether a child can physically handle fasting at certain ages—or is it a halachic dispute about the nature of chinuch (education in mitzvos)? He argues emphatically that the Amoraim cannot be disagreeing about medical facts; rather, they dispute the legal status of a katan's fasting.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Yoma 82a
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
When an animal damages crops, the Torah prescribes a unique payment formula based on multiplying the damaged area by sixty. Does this formula redefine the actual loss, or does it merely create a payment mechanism that still acknowledges the full damage sustained? The Gemara explores whether someone who ate in doubt should pay the higher-quality amount, examining how the principle of motzi me-chaveiro alav haraya applies when payments fall within the range of actual loss.
What makes testimony valid when different witnesses testify to different parts of the same event? The Gemara debates whether the principle of "davar v'lo chatzi davar" (complete testimony, not partial) disqualifies witnesses who testify separately to theft and slaughter. Rashi's approach reveals that the issue is not merely combining elements, but whether each witness's statement is independently meaningful.
Why is a ganav who sells a stolen animal on Shabbos exempt from the fourfold/fivefold payment? The shiur analyzes whether this exemption stems from kam lei b'derabbah or from the absence of a valid mechira. The Rashba's principle that matana resembles mechira when it is "nishtarish b'chet" is explored, along with the Rambam's position on hekdesh and the distinction between giving to bedek habayis versus mizbe'ach.
When a ganav shechts a stolen animal l'avodah zarah, why isn't he patur from payment since it's already isur hana'ah? The shiur explores the fundamental machloket Rashi-Tosafot on whether the isur derives from the act of shechita or from the din shechita itself. The Gemara's application of davar garem be'mamon ke'mamon domi extends the analysis to when borrowed animals become niskal.
