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When a father and adult son both need pidyon haben but only have enough for one, who goes first? The shiur examines Rishonim's starkly different readings: the Rif sees commitment as the core obligation, the Rosh separates commitment from money, and the Rambam (רמב"ם) limits commitment to the father's obligation for his son—each yielding a different understanding of mitzvah (מצוה) degufo adif and the machlokes Tannaim.
This shiur analyzes Kiddushin 29a-b, focusing on the Mishna's discussion of pidyon haben when both a father (who was never redeemed) and his son need redemption. The Mishna presents a dispute: the Chachamim say the father comes first ("hu kodem livno"), while Rabbi Yehuda holds that the son takes precedence ("bno kodem"). The Gemara (גמרא) introduces a critical case through Rabbi Yirmiyahu: when there is only enough money for one redemption (five sela'im), the father must redeem himself first because "mitzvah (מצוה) degufo adif"—a person's own mitzvah takes precedence. Rabbi Zweig explores how the major Rishonim understand this sugya in fundamentally different ways. The Geonim rule like Rabbi Yehuda that the son comes first when there is sufficient money for both, which seems to contradict the general principle of halacha (הלכה) k'Rabbim. The Rif paskens that when both are possible, the father comes first, giving the reason "mitzvah degufo adif"—but the Gemara only stated this principle for the case of limited funds, not for the general case. The Rambam (רמב"ם) brings two separate halachos: first, that the father comes before the son, and second, that when there is only five sela'im, the father still comes first—implying these are independent principles.
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Kiddushin 29a-b
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