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Why is kiddushin invalid when a man attempts to marry a woman with a loan he extended her? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "milvah lo tzo nitna" seems obvious, yet Rashi (רש"י) explains the real issue through "kicha mistay Efron"—requiring an actual act of transfer at the moment of kiddushin. This creates a fundamental machlokes with Tosafot about whether loan-based kiddushin fails because of general kinyan law or a specific gezeiras haKasuv unique to kiddushin.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Kiddushin 6b concerning HaMekadesh B'Milveh—a man attempting to effect kiddushin by forgiving a debt he is owed. The Mishna states that such kiddushin is invalid. Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation requires careful analysis: he cites the principle "milvah lo tzo nitna" (a loan is not considered as having been given) and grounds this in the gezeiras haKasuv of "kicha mistay Efron"—the paradigm of actual transfer derived from Avrohom's purchase from Efron. The shiur opens by questioning Rashi's approach. Why does Rashi invoke kicha mistay Efron? If the issue is simply that there is no kesef (money) present because milvah lo tzo nitna, Rashi could have simply stated that kiddushin requires kesef and a loan doesn't qualify. By bringing kicha mistay Efron, Rashi appears to be making a chiddush: there is a specific din in kiddushin—beyond general hilchos kinyanim—that requires an actual act of giving (nesina) at the moment of kiddushin, modeled after the transaction with Efron.
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Kiddushin 6b
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