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Why is kiddushin invalid when a man attempts to marry a woman with a loan he extended her? The Gemara (גמרא)'s principle "milvah lo tzo nitna" seems obvious, yet Rashi (רש"י) explains the real issue through "kicha mistay Efron"—requiring an actual act of transfer at the moment of kiddushin. This creates a fundamental machlokes with Tosafot about whether loan-based kiddushin fails because of general kinyan law or a specific gezeiras haKasuv unique to kiddushin.
The shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Kiddushin 6b concerning HaMekadesh B'Milveh—a man attempting to effect kiddushin by forgiving a debt he is owed. The Mishna states that such kiddushin is invalid. Rashi (רש"י)'s explanation requires careful analysis: he cites the principle "milvah lo tzo nitna" (a loan is not considered as having been given) and grounds this in the gezeiras haKasuv of "kicha mistay Efron"—the paradigm of actual transfer derived from Avrohom's purchase from Efron. The shiur opens by questioning Rashi's approach. Why does Rashi invoke kicha mistay Efron? If the issue is simply that there is no kesef (money) present because milvah lo tzo nitna, Rashi could have simply stated that kiddushin requires kesef and a loan doesn't qualify. By bringing kicha mistay Efron, Rashi appears to be making a chiddush: there is a specific din in kiddushin—beyond general hilchos kinyanim—that requires an actual act of giving (nesina) at the moment of kiddushin, modeled after the transaction with Efron.
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Kiddushin 6b
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
