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Why does the Torah (תורה) need two verses to teach that an amah ivriah goes free at naarah and bogeres? The Gemara (גמרא)'s method of boz zeh v'limed al zeh (one teaches about the other) creates deep conceptual questions: how can a father sell his daughter beyond the time he owns her, and why can't an ailonit (who never develops) be sold without an explicit verse?
This shiur on Kiddushin 4a explores a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) discussing when an amah ivriah (Hebrew maidservant) goes free. The Torah (תורה) appears to have two verses teaching this law—one stating she goes free at naarah and another at bogeres. The Gemara employs the principle of boz zeh v'limed al zeh (this one comes to teach about that one) to resolve what would otherwise be redundant verses. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing a parallel to understand this principle. Just as by eved the Torah writes both "toshav" and "sakir" to teach that neither can eat terumah, here too the double language teaches distinct categories. The shiur analyzes why we can't simply have one verse—if the Torah said only "toshav," we might think a nirutz (pierced servant who extended his service) could eat terumah because his relationship is purely personal rather than ownership-based. The dual terminology teaches that nirutz includes both the business relationship of sakir AND a personal dimension.
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Kiddushin 4a
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