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Why does the Torah (תורה) need two verses to teach that an amah ivriah goes free at naarah and bogeres? The Gemara (גמרא)'s method of boz zeh v'limed al zeh (one teaches about the other) creates deep conceptual questions: how can a father sell his daughter beyond the time he owns her, and why can't an ailonit (who never develops) be sold without an explicit verse?
This shiur on Kiddushin 4a explores a fundamental Gemara (גמרא) discussing when an amah ivriah (Hebrew maidservant) goes free. The Torah (תורה) appears to have two verses teaching this law—one stating she goes free at naarah and another at bogeres. The Gemara employs the principle of boz zeh v'limed al zeh (this one comes to teach about that one) to resolve what would otherwise be redundant verses. Rabbi Zweig begins by establishing a parallel to understand this principle. Just as by eved the Torah writes both "toshav" and "sakir" to teach that neither can eat terumah, here too the double language teaches distinct categories. The shiur analyzes why we can't simply have one verse—if the Torah said only "toshav," we might think a nirutz (pierced servant who extended his service) could eat terumah because his relationship is purely personal rather than ownership-based. The dual terminology teaches that nirutz includes both the business relationship of sakir AND a personal dimension.
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Kiddushin 4a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
