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How can Makkos 5a say each false witness pays the full amount while Makkos 3a says they only pay half? The shiur develops two approaches: either false witness liability is a group obligation requiring full participation, or it distinguishes between restoration (money) versus punishment (lashes).
The shiur addresses a fundamental contradiction between two sugyos in Masechta Makkos regarding the liability of false witnesses (eidim zomemim). On daf 5a, the Gemara (גמרא) indicates that in cases of kasher zamam (what they intended to do), each witness must pay the full amount or receive full punishment. However, on daf 3a, the Gemara suggests that when one witness admits guilt, he only pays half, implying that normally each witness is only liable for their proportional share. Rabbi Zweig presents two primary approaches to resolve this contradiction. The first approach, following Abaye's position, distinguishes between different types of obligations. Money payments are in the category of restoring the victim (tashlumim), where the goal is to make the victim whole. Therefore, half payments from each witness can accomplish this restoration, making money "mitztaref" (combinable). However, lashes (malkus) are in the category of punishment for wickedness (risha), not restoration. Since the punishment must be complete and indivisible, half-lashes accomplish nothing - "ain malkus lemechzah" (lashes cannot be divided).
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Makkos 5a
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