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When can ambiguous language create a valid marriage? The Gemara (גמרא) analyzes phrases like "miuked is," "miued is," and "charufasi" that might mean marriage or might mean employment. The core tension: if the couple is engaged in marriage discussions (asukim b'oso inyan), does that context validate otherwise unclear language, or does saying the wrong words ruin even an obvious marriage context?
This advanced shiur explores a complex passage in Kiddushin 5b concerning alternative language formulations (lashonos) that might or might not effect kiddushin. The Gemara (גמרא) examines several expressions—miuked is, miued is, salosi, negdasi, charufa—that could mean either marriage or employment (melacha), creating fundamental uncertainty about their validity for kiddushin. The shiur opens by establishing two categories of cases. The first category involves language like "miuked is" (designated for me) and "miued is" (appointed for me). Rashi (רש"י) explains that miuked is derives from the pasuk describing how Hashem (ה׳) closed Adam's wound after creating Chavah—a lashon associated with marriage formation. The Rambam (רמב"ם), however, offers a radically different interpretation: these terms reflect a king's legal right to designate a woman as his pilegesh (concubine). According to the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim perek dalet, just as a king has rights to conscript citizens and property, he can acquire a woman through simple designation (miyuk). The Rambam extends this to an amah ivriya—when her master designates her for himself, the kinyan that gave him ownership rights in her labor can transform into kinyan ishus. This reading suggests that miuked and miued are not metaphorical references to marriage but actual legal mechanisms of yichud-based acquisition.
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Kiddushin 5b
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