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When a kohen performs the Temple service, is he acting as the owner's agent (shlucho didan) or as God's agent (shlucho d'rachmana)? The Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion on Nedarim 35 raises a fundamental question: if kohanim work on the owner's behalf, how can one forbidden from benefit use their service? The shiur explores multiple Rishonim approaches—the Ran, Tosafot, and Rashba—distinguishing between types of service, levels of agency, and what constitutes "working for someone" versus mere benefit.
This shiur analyzes a fundamental sugya in Nedarim 35 concerning whether kohanim performing Temple service act as agents of the owner (shlucho didan) or agents of God (shlucho d'rachmana). The question becomes critical when a kohen is forbidden by vow (mudar) from deriving benefit from a specific individual (the madir) yet must perform service for that person's korban. The Rashba cites Tosafot's question: the Gemara (גמרא) in Kiddushin already established that kohanim work as shlucho d'rachmana based on the principle of "mi she'ein yachol la'asot—what one cannot do himself, he cannot appoint an agent to do." Since a non-kohen (zar) cannot perform the Temple service, the kohen cannot be his agent. Yet the Gemara in Nedarim raises the question anew. The Rashba distinguishes: Kiddushin discusses the service from kabbalas hadam (receiving the blood) onward, which is inherently priestly service (mitzvas kehuna). Nedarim, however, discusses shechitah, which can be performed by a non-kohen. Therefore, by shechitah, there remains a possibility of shlucho didan—the kohen might be acting as the owner's agent because the owner himself could accomplish what shechitah accomplishes.
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Nedarim 35a
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