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Why distinguish between av (primary category) and tolda (derivative) when both incur one korban? The shiur explores Rashi (רש"י)'s assertion that you're not mechuyav on a tolda b'mokom av and analyzes Tosafos (תוספות)'s debate over whether hasra for a tolda must invoke the av, touching on the Minchas Chinuch's view and the fundamental relationship between primary and derivative categories.
This shiur tackles a fundamental sugya at the opening of Bava Kamma 2a concerning the conceptual distinction between avos (primary categories) and toldos (derivative categories) of liability. The Gemara (גמרא) asks: why call one an av and the other a tolda when both result in only one korban if performed b'helem echad (in one lapse of awareness)? If two different avos done b'helem echad obligate two korbanos, but two instances of the same av obligate only one, what purpose does the av/tolda distinction serve? Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation proposes a radical chiddush: "av v'tolda didei lo mechuyav al kol echad v'echad" — you are not mechuyav on the tolda at all when performed together with its av. This appears to go beyond the Gemara's statement that you bring only one korban; Rashi seems to be saying there is no chiyuv whatsoever on the tolda b'mokom av. The shiur explores the implications: if one remembered only the tolda and brought a korban, then later remembered the av, would a second korban be required? According to Rashi's formulation, apparently not — the tolda never generated a chiyuv in the first place. This stands in stark contrast to performing the same av twice, where each act is independently mechayev, though only one korban is brought for the unified helem.
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Bava Kamma 2a
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