A free account is required to play audio and download files.
No community start suggestion yet.
How can a husband be masalek from rights he doesn't yet have—like peiros or yerusha—when there's nothing currently to give up? The shiur develops the distinction between siluk (giving up a right) and tanai (restructuring the deal): bei od arusa works because it structures the marriage itself to exclude those rights, not because it retroactively transfers something that doesn't exist.
This shiur provides a comprehensive analysis of Gittin 77b, focusing on the fundamental question of how a person can relinquish rights to property or benefits that do not yet exist—a davar she'lo ba l'olam. The central sugya revolves around a husband's ability to be masalek (remove himself) from achilus peiros (eating the fruits) of his wife's property, and the parallel case of Rav Kahana regarding yerusha (inheritance). The Gemara (גמרא) raises a fundamental difficulty: "mashakanti ish akanti baila"—if something is already acquired to the husband (like peiros), how can mere verbal relinquishment (siluk) work without a formal transfer (lashon matana)? The Gemara's answer is "ba'oi darusa"—it works when done while still betrothed, before the rights actually vest. But this creates its own problem: how can one give up something one doesn't yet have? You cannot change your mind about something that doesn't exist; there's no real smichus hada'as (firm resolution) on a davar she'lo ba l'olam.
Looking for the full summary?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Gittin 77b
Looking for the full transcript?
Full access is available to members of the TUF Alumni Association or the Yam Hagadol Foundation.
Already a member? Let the admin know!
Dedicate a Shiur in Gemara
L'ilui nishmas a loved one. In honor of a simcha or yahrzeit. As a zechus for a refuah sheleimah. Your dedication helps carry Rabbi Zweig's Torah to learners around the world.
Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
