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What does "lidei shaveh li" (it's worth that to me) mean when redeeming a firstborn son with an object worth less than five selaim in the market? The shiur develops multiple approaches to understanding whether pidyon haben requires market value or personal benefit, analyzing Tosfos, the Ran, Beit Yosef, and Rambam (רמב"ם)'s divergent positions on the relationship between price and value.
This shiur explores Kiddushin 8a's discussion of the principle of "lidei shaveh li" (it's worth that to me) in the context of pidyon haben. The Gemara (גמרא) presents a case where Rav Kahana, a gavra rabbah (great person), accepted a sudra (head covering) worth three selaim as if it were worth five for pidyon haben by declaring "lidei shaveh li." Tosfos raises a fundamental question: what is the difference between lidei shaveh li and matana al menat lehachzir (a gift on condition to return)? In both cases, the object doesn't have its full value to the recipient—yet matana al menat lehachzir is valid for pidyon haben. Why should lidei shaveh li be different?
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Kiddushin 8a
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