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Why isn't psik reisha d'lo nichle considered ein hamachaven rather than melacha she'ain tzrich legufa? The shiur analyzes Rav Kivagar's complex kashe that questions this fundamental distinction. Different Rishonim disagree whether mafis morsah is melacha she'ain tzrich legufa or ein hamachaven, revealing deep conceptual differences.
The shiur opens with an analysis of a complex passage in Tosafot dealing with psik reisha d'lo nichle (unintended inevitable consequence where one doesn't want the result). Rabbi Zweig examines Rav Kivagar's fundamental kashe: why should psik reisha d'lo nichle be classified as melacha she'ain tzrich legufa (work not needed for its own sake) when it seems more like ein hamachaven (lacking intention)? The Kesef Mishneh's approach is presented, distinguishing between psik reisha and melacha she'ain tzrich legufa based on intention levels. By psik reisha, one has no intention for the melacha at all - it just happens b'heichrech (inevitably). By melacha she'ain tzrich legufa, one intends the action but not its purpose as defined in the Mishkan. This creates a hierarchy where melacha she'ain tzrich legufa involves more kavanah than psik reisha.
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Kesubos 6a
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