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Can chupa create kiddushin? The shiur analyzes Rashi (רש"י)'s interpretation that only chupa performed against a ketana's will—where the father gives her over—counts as a true kinyan. Unlike the yichud understanding of chupa, Rashi sees the ba'al korcha case as proof that chupa is a ma'aseh kinyan, not just a relationship designation.
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of Kiddushin 3a-3b, focusing on Rashi (רש"י)'s understanding of chupa as a form of kiddushin according to Rav Huna. The central question addressed is how chupa can be learned out from the gezeirah shava of kicha kicha from a field, and what type of chupa qualifies as a valid kinyan. Rabbi Zweig begins by examining Rashi's enigmatic comment on the Gemara (גמרא)'s discussion of chupa: "shemasru lo avi'el l'chupa leshen kidushin u'ikdeshes bekach" (that her father gives her over to chupa for the purpose of kiddushin). The shiur questions why Rashi specifically mentions the father giving over his daughter, when the Gemara in Heilman seems to make no such distinction. Through careful analysis of the sugya, it becomes clear that Rashi is reading the entire discussion through a particular lens.
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Kiddushin 3a-3b
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