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Why are eidim zomemim liable even when the defendant already paid the money they falsely testified he owed? The shiur explores the Riva's principle of efshar b'chazara—that reversible payments preserve the status of kaasher zamam rather than kaasher asah. A fundamental chakira emerges: is kaasher asah a petur because the edim became "oysim" (doers) rather than "zomemim," or because the beis din judgment was already executed and the case is closed?
This shiur presents an in-depth analysis of the halachic principle of kaasher zamam kaasher asah as it applies to eidim zomemim (conspiring witnesses), focusing primarily on the approach of the Riva and related Rishonim. The central issue is how to understand the exemption of eidim zomemim when their false testimony has already been carried out (kaasher asah), and whether this exemption applies to monetary cases. The shiur begins by presenting the sugya in Bava Kamma 4b, where Rav Kirya lists eidim zomemim as one of the twenty-four avos nezikin (primary categories of damages). The Riva derives from this that eidim zomemim must be liable even after the defendant (nidaim) has already paid the money, otherwise they could not be called "mazikim" (damagers). The Riva explains this with the principle of efshar b'chazara—since monetary payments can be reversed, the act is not truly considered "asah" (done) and therefore the witnesses remain liable.
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Bava Kamma 4b
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