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Why is there a meira (flaw) when a slave, woman, or minor leads you in a mitzvah (מצוה) you know? The shiur analyzes the Rashi (רש"י)-Tosfos debate: Rashi holds the problem is appearing like you don't know (lo lamad), while Tosfos distinguishes between shomea k'oneh through a gadol (which counts as speech) versus a katon (which remains mere listening), making it a lesser kium.
The shiur examines a fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos regarding the din of "tov alav meira" - the flaw that occurs when an eved, isha, or katon makes you yotzei a mitzvah (מצוה). The Gemara (גמרא) on Sukkah 38a discusses Hallel, while a parallel Braisa addresses Birchas Hamazon, with the critical question being why the Rambam (רמב"ם) includes the din of "tov alav meira" in Hilchos Birchas Hamazon but omits it from Hilchos Chanukah (חנוכה) (Hallel). Rashi's position is that the meira exists only when one is "lo lamad" - when the person doesn't know the text. If someone knows it (lamad), there should be no problem being yotzei through another person, since shomea k'oneh means you're yotzei through listening, which is equivalent to doing the mitzvah yourself. The shiur develops that according to Rashi, even by Hallel where you're saying it anyway, the meira is creating the appearance of being lo lamad - doing it in a "lo lamad dikah way." This public display of ignorance, using a katon to prompt you, is itself the bizayon (embarrassment), regardless of whether you actually know it or not.
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Sukkah 38a
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Why does the Gemara present a kal v'chomer for chuppah making kiddushin based on kesef not being maichel b'terumah, only to reject it? The shiur reveals that even the rejected kal v'chomer establishes a fundamental yesod: kiddushin is a kinyan for ishus (marital relationship), not merely a kinyan in hilchos kinyanim. The second kal v'chomer—from chuppah being gomeres—raises Tosafos's famous question.
Is the kesef used in kiddushin a true kinyan (acquisition), or merely a symbolic means of establishing marriage? The shiur analyzes multiple interpretations of the Gemara's derivation from ki yikach ki'ach mi'Sayeffron, exploring whether marriage constitutes ownership, and develops three fundamental approaches: (1) The Gemara proves ishus is a kinyan, (2) ishus is not a kinyan but uses kinyan-like means, or (3) ishus is a kinyan but the kesef may not be a ma'aseh kinyan. The Rambam's position—calling kesef "midivrei sofrim"—is explained as distinguishing between cross-referencing concepts versus borrowing terminology.
Why does the Mishna alternate between the language of "kinyan" (acquisition) and "kiddushin" (sanctification) when describing marriage? The shiur develops a fundamental distinction: marriage has two separate aspects—a kinyan dimension (ownership) and a kedusha dimension (sanctified relationship). Either aspect can initiate the bond, and understanding this dual nature resolves multiple textual and halachic questions throughout the sugya.
Does kiddushei shetar require a shevah pruta? The Ran presents two approaches to the Rif's position. The shiur develops the Ran's second pshat that shetar kiddushin functions as a hachnah (exchange) rather than a mere kinyan nesina. This reading has profound implications for isuri hana'ah, mechubar, and the relationship between kesef and shetar.
