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Why is there a meira (flaw) when a slave, woman, or minor leads you in a mitzvah (מצוה) you know? The shiur analyzes the Rashi (רש"י)-Tosfos debate: Rashi holds the problem is appearing like you don't know (lo lamad), while Tosfos distinguishes between shomea k'oneh through a gadol (which counts as speech) versus a katon (which remains mere listening), making it a lesser kium.
The shiur examines a fundamental disagreement between Rashi (רש"י) and Tosfos regarding the din of "tov alav meira" - the flaw that occurs when an eved, isha, or katon makes you yotzei a mitzvah (מצוה). The Gemara (גמרא) on Sukkah 38a discusses Hallel, while a parallel Braisa addresses Birchas Hamazon, with the critical question being why the Rambam (רמב"ם) includes the din of "tov alav meira" in Hilchos Birchas Hamazon but omits it from Hilchos Chanukah (חנוכה) (Hallel). Rashi's position is that the meira exists only when one is "lo lamad" - when the person doesn't know the text. If someone knows it (lamad), there should be no problem being yotzei through another person, since shomea k'oneh means you're yotzei through listening, which is equivalent to doing the mitzvah yourself. The shiur develops that according to Rashi, even by Hallel where you're saying it anyway, the meira is creating the appearance of being lo lamad - doing it in a "lo lamad dikah way." This public display of ignorance, using a katon to prompt you, is itself the bizayon (embarrassment), regardless of whether you actually know it or not.
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Sukkah 38a
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